Civilian and Military Power (Belgium)

A Neutral State with the King at the Head of the Army

To understand the relationship between the civil and military authorities on the eve of the First World War, Belgium’s neutral status is key. Maintaining neutrality was the cornerstone of Belgium’s security and defence policy. This meant that the country had to defend its borders. At the same time, it could rely on guarantors of neutrality in the event of a violation. If Belgium wanted to benefit from the protection of the treaties, its army had to be capable of defending its borders, otherwise its allies would not guarantee Belgian neutrality.¹

Throughout the 19th century, Belgian society was not militarised to the same extent as its neighbours France and Germany.² This was due to its neutral status and the fierce anti-militarism of two of its three main political parties (the Catholic and Socialist parties). While France and Germany underwent rapid processes of democratisation, nationalisation, and militarisation, resulting in significantly larger armies, the Belgian army remained relatively small. Wealthy citizens could buy their way out of military service through the conscription system, a lottery system with the possibility of substitution.³ It was only in the years leading up to the First World War that a gradual change took place, with a growing awareness that reforms were necessary to counter external threats.

The Belgian constitution designated the king as supreme commander of the army (art. 68). His role was to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the country.⁴ Both King Albert I (1875-1934) and his predecessor King Leopold II (1835-1909) took this task very seriously and sought to counterbalance the prevailing anti-militarism of the dominant political classes. Both monarchs advocated for a stronger army and building fortifications, proposed necessary reforms, and often maintained a good relationship with influential figures within the military who shared these views. In theory, however, the monarch could do little more than influence policy and try to exercise power. The executive (the government and its ministers) and the legislative (parliament) forces were responsible for making policy and providing the legal framework. The minister of war, until 1912 often an officer-technician, played a crucial role. As the head of the army in peacetime, he acted as a bridge between the government, the army, and the War Ministry.⁵

1911-1914: Power Struggle over Army Reform and How to Defend the Country

In August 1914, Belgium was not a non-militarised state.⁶ However, the army reforms of the previous years came too late to make a significant difference on the battlefield. This idea, that Belgium’s defence policy was inadequate compared to its neighbours, came about rather suddenly and was a direct consequence of international events, in particular the Agadir Crisis in the late summer of 1911 and the subsequent threat of war between France and Germany.⁷ From then on, the Catholic head of government, Charles de Broqueville (1860-1940), with the support of the king and military leadership, began to make up for lost time.⁸ In the meantime, the position of the Socialist Party evolved from strongly anti-militarist around 1890 to pro-military on the eve of the First World War.⁹

Three factions were engaged in a fierce power struggle: the king and his entourage, including some high-ranking officers of the Headquarters; the Catholic government led by Charles de Broqueville, who took over as minister of war from General Joseph Hellebaut (1842-1924) in 1912; and the army itself, which had a polycentric decision-making process.¹⁰ The Headquarters had an autonomous position alongside the minister of war but was internally divided and often at odds with the War Ministry and the minister in charge.

To succeed, de Broqueville had to navigate between these different actors. In the years before the war, he tried to push through four reforms.¹¹ The first major dossier, which he managed to complete before the 1912 elections, concerned the internal structure of the army and the reform of the command and composition of the Headquarters.¹² Closely linked to this was the discussion of the strategic plan in the event of a German invasion (central defence vs. border defence). This issue remained unresolved until August 1914, resulting in a lack of detailed defence plans.¹³ The third and perhaps most important dossier was the question of military service and more specifically the introduction of personal and general conscription, which aimed to double the number of soldiers from 180,000 to 360,000. After the introduction of conscription of one son per family in 1909 which abolished the draft lottery and substitution, general conscription was introduced in 1913.¹⁴ In the same year, the government also resolved a fourth issue relating to the language problem in the army. After much heated debate, this finally resulted in the 1913 Law on the Use of Language in the Army.¹⁵

The delayed implementation and the difficult execution of these reforms and measures left the Belgian army unprepared to face the events of August 1914.

August 1914: The King Takes Control

Tensions and uncertainties reached their peak in the days before and immediately after the war reached Belgian territory. On 29 July 1914, the king chaired the Council of Ministers, which decided to place the army upon a strengthened peace footing. Two days later, on the 31 July, general mobilisation followed, as Russia, Germany, and France sent each other ultimatums. On 1 August 1914, King Albert I made a final attempt to avert war by writing to the German Kaiser Wilhelm II (1859-1941). However, this did little to change the course of events, as Belgium received an ultimatum from Germany the following day on 2 August 1914. The Belgian government rejected the ultimatum on 3 August and immediately called on for help those who were in charge for guaranteeing neutrality. The German army invaded Belgium on 4 August.

In the early days of the war, King Albert I and Prime Minister Charles de Broqueville took the political and military lead, both consolidating their authority.¹⁶ They convened the Council of Ministers, which included military leaders and was chaired by the king, and decided that the country would fulfil its international obligations to defend the territory.¹⁷ To ensure broad support for Belgium’s war policy, three ministers of state were appointed, two liberals and one socialist, who later became full ministers. Meanwhile, the Chamber and Senate, in a joint session, approved ten government bills enabling the country to go to war.¹⁸

At the same time, King Albert I stepped forward as commander-in-chief of the Belgian army, a role he took very seriously.¹⁹ However, his relationship with Chief of Staff Antonin de Selliers de Moranville (1852-1945), a protégé of de Broqueville, was strained. Strategic disagreements over how to counter the German army proved irreconcilable, and Selliers de Moranville found himself excluded from key decisions and eventually got sidelined.²⁰ The compromise reached between de Broqueville and the king involved Colonel (later General) Felix Wielemans (1863-1917), de Broqueville’s former chief of cabinet at the War Ministry. As Selliers de Moranville’s successor, Wielemans was more diplomatic, leaving the actual command to King Albert I, while playing a crucial role in the organisation and transformation of the Belgian army.²¹

1915-1918: The King in Action

When the war of movement came to an end in the autumn of 1914, most of Belgium came under German occupation. The country was divided into different occupation zones: the General Government, the “Marinegebiet,” and the “Etappengebieten.” There, mayors and local authorities, as representatives of the local population, faced the German occupier.²² They received help of the powerful “Comité national de Secours et d’Alimentation.” The king and government lost control and the national parliament ceased to function. Belgium was thus the only Western European democratic state to wage war for four years without national representation.²³ Consequently, the idea of a “home front” was less relevant in Belgium than in other belligerent countries. Most Belgian civilians experienced the war through occupation or as refugees abroad.²⁴ Although the occupied territories and the front area were separated for four years, they were closely linked. The attitude of the civilian population under occupation, a war effort in its own right, gained significance in relation to the sacrifices made by the soldiers at the front.²⁵

The physical distance between King Albert I, as commander-in-chief close to his troops at the front, and the government in exile at Saint-Adresse (near Le Havre) strained the fragile balance of power established in the autumn of 1914. The power struggle between the king and the government continued, fuelled by the king’s desire to make independent decisions about both political and military matters, often at odds with the views of the government or the Headquarters.

Personal Command

The debate about King Albert I’s personal military command and his actions under ministerial responsibility continued throughout the war. The king declared war, decided to mobilise, decided to ask the Allies for help, etc. All this was done under the control of the ministers involved and thus with the approval of the government.²⁶ For purely military strategic and tactical decisions, however, there was less or no ministerial control. Here the king acted alone, with the help of his direct advisers such as Emile Galet (1870-1940). As a result, King Albert, who believed that the Constitution entrusted him personally with supreme command, paid little heed to the ministerial control of de Broqueville and his colleagues. This led to tensions, but a compromise was found. Major strategic decisions often received tacit approval after consultation.²⁷

Chief of Staff Wielemans played an important role, signing and disseminating the king’s orders. This modus vivendi lasted throughout the war and only flared up during the German spring offensive of 1918, when de Broqueville again claimed ministerial responsibility for all military decisions. The sensitivity of the issue was reflected in its outcome: in May 1918, de Broqueville resigned and Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Louis Ruquoy (1861-1937), who had succeeded Wielemans after his death, was replaced by Lieutenant General Cyriaque Gillain (1857-1931). Persistent disagreements on military tactics and personnel appointments between Ruquoy and the king (and his advisor Galet) led to an irreparable breakdown of trust.²⁸

A Defensive and National Neutrality Policy Aimed at Peace

As head of state and commander-in-chief, King Albert I had a personal and constitutional duty to serve the country’s interests to the best of his ability. His political stance, which highlighted the interplay and conflicts between civil and military power, was based on three pillars: 1) a defensive military tactic focused exclusively on Belgian war aims, 2) the preservation of the country’s neutrality and independence at all costs, and 3) the search for a compromise peace.

The king’s military strategy focused on defending the unoccupied territory behind the Yser and the complete liberation of the country, with the aim of restoring territorial integrity. This defensive approach avoided heavy losses in function of Allied war aims.²⁹ Until the final offensive, King Albert I refused to involve the Belgian army in major Allied offensives, despite British and French requests. He also insisted that joint actions be carried out strictly under Belgian command, emphasising a national course of neutrality and independence, free from Allied war aims.³⁰ While the Allies wanted to defeat Germany unconditionally, in late 1915 and early 1916, King Albert was thinking about a peace compromise to end the war. These actions not only went against government policy, but also deviated from the king’s own strictly neutral course.³¹

King Albert’s perspective revealed a pessimistic view on how the war would evolve, contrasting with some government members in exile who supported Allied war aims and joining the London Pact of 5 September 1914. They advocated for a more offensive Belgian military stance and harboured annexationist plans for post-war negotiations.³² One such minister was Prime Minister de Broqueville, who only later during the war shifted to a position more favorable to King Albert I, having become convinced of the necessity of a compromise peace. This issue of conflicting political visions persisted throughout the war, occasionally flaring up but generally remaining behind closed doors, as King Albert I could not publicly oppose the government.³³

The Language Question at the Front

A third issue that significantly influenced the relationship between the civil authorities, king, and military commanders was the “language question” at the front. The government’s hopes of solving this problem with the Law on the Use of Language in the Army (1913) proved to be in vain. Dutch-speaking soldiers, who made up the majority of the Belgian army (due to their recruitment at the beginning of the war), felt shortchanged by the predominantly French-speaking corps of officers and non-commissioned officers. Their discontent grew as the war progressed and war fatigue set in. The government was too divided and saw no alternative but to continue to advocate a better application of the 1913 language law.³⁴ It lacked the mandate and consensus for new legislative initiatives or other measures. In order to preserve national unity, the language issue was part of the so-called “treuga dei.” Following this logic, the government also refused to make any concrete concessions or promises to the Flemish movement regarding post-war developments.

As the war progressed, it became increasingly difficult to maintain this stance. Agitation in the press, among a small group of intellectuals at the front (known as the Front Movement) and among some soldiers only intensified. This reaction was largely a response to events in the occupied country, where activists, thanks to the Flamenpolitik of the occupier, managed to establish a Flemish university in Ghent, implement the administrative separation of the country, and set up a Council of Flanders. While the government limited itself to symbolic measures to speed up the bilingualisation of the army (translations, language tests, etc.), the military leadership reacted mainly with repression, disciplinary measures, and censorship. The Minister of War, Armand De Ceuninck (1858-1935), who took office in August 1917, and the military leadership made it clear that they were not open to comprehensive reforms of the army while the war was still raging.³⁵

King Albert I considered the language issue in the army to be a purely political matter, and thus a matter for the government.³⁶ Although he did not take clear public positions and often opted for vague wording, behind the scenes he pursued three objectives: 1) to reduce tensions to prevent them from getting worse; 2) to ensure the effectiveness of the army and national unity; and 3) to preserve the French language and culture in Flanders.³⁷ From this perspective, repression by the military leadership and better compliance with language requirements and the expansion of bilingualism among officers, as stipulated in the 1913 language law, were not mutually exclusive.

The End of the War

As the tide of war turned, so did King Albert’s strategy. In September 1918, after four years of refusal, he decided to take part for the first time in a major Allied offensive. From then on, the Belgian army became part of the Allied Army Group Flanders, officially commanded by the Belgian monarch, but on the ground led by a French general.³⁸ This allowed King Albert to be welcomed as a liberator in the formerly occupied territory. His power, political influence, and popularity grew more than ever. This proved advantageous when he claimed a central role in the immediate post-war political reforms that changed Belgian political history. He personally appointed a new government that included representatives of the Comité National de Secours et d’Alimentation and symbolised national unity, including socialists, liberals, and Catholics. This culminated in the Loppem Agreements which introduced universal suffrage.³⁹

The consequences of the shifting balance of power during the war were not only felt in the immediate post-war period when King Albert I used his moral authority and popularity to legitimise drastic political reforms. The long-term effects were also significant, as King Leopold III (1901-1983) policies at the beginning and during the Second World War showed. He closely followed his father’s stance, but with different results: a serious political crisis (referred to as the Royal Question) that eventually led to his abdication.⁴⁰

General Conclusion

The First World War exposed and intensified the complex and often fragile relationship between Belgium’s civil and military authorities. While the constitutional framework positioned the monarch as commander-in-chief, in practice the division of power between the king, government, and military leadership was neither clearly defined nor consistently applied. The early months of the war brought an extraordinary assertion of royal authority, with King Albert I assuming a prominent role in military decision-making. In doing so, he significantly increased his power over both the civil and military authorities. This contrasted with some of his counterparts elsewhere in Europe, who tended to lose power to the executive and/or the military. In Belgium, the traditional checks and balances of the constitutional system were to some extent reversed. Ministers had to assert their right to information, while the monarch made the decisions.

Efforts to reform the Belgian army in the years preceding the war, including the introduction of general conscription and the restructuring of command, were late and unevenly implemented, leaving the military ill-prepared for the German invasion. These reforms, though significant, did not fully resolve underlying tensions between the Ministry of War, the army headquarters, and the civilian government. Moreover, during the war, conflicting strategic visions between the King and the government in exile persisted, particularly concerning Belgium’s role within the Allied framework and the ultimate objectives of the conflict.

In parallel, the unresolved “language question” within the army reflected deeper societal divisions. Despite the 1913 legislation aimed at improving linguistic equality, the predominance of French within the officer corps and the lack of concrete follow-up during the war alienated many Dutch-speaking soldiers. Military and political leaders, prioritising national unity and operational discipline, largely resisted more substantive reforms, contributing to rising tensions among the rank and file and within public discourse.

Taken together, these elements reveal a wartime governance model marked by improvisation, contestation, and shifting balances of power. The war acted as a catalyst for structural change, both in the military and in the political system, but also laid bare the institutional ambiguities and sociopolitical fractures that would continue to shape Belgian public life in the decades to follow.

Jan Naert, State Archives of Belgium and Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)